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Revelations

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Dear Peter,

I suspect that you would like Glafkos Klerides. I certainly did--both when I first met him early last December, and on the two subsequent occasions when he responded to my inquiries. I can almost see the man now. I will not soon forget the twinkle in his eye or the smile that from time to time played across his face. As he sat in the chair in his office, fingering his worry beads, I could not help but think of him as a leprechaun. Such is the man's charm.

Klerides is a short, graying Greek Cypriot--stout in a barrel-chested way, but not obese in the fashion of his ancient antagonist Rauf Denктаş; clothed on virtually all occasions in a highly respectable three-piece suit; and, as his choice of clothing may suggest, a British barrister heart and soul. Or so it might seem to the unsuspecting eye--for Klerides is also a Levantine politician who must be capable of ignoring the legal proprieties when circumstances warrant their neglect; and, at least in his youth, he was a man of action. During the Second World War, the aging gentleman I met just a few months ago had served as an RAF pilot. In the course of that conflict, he was twice shot down; and he escaped from his German captors on no less than three occasions. As the British would put it, he had a good war.

In London, while studying law, he met and married an Anglo-Indian. After the war, the young couple journeyed back to Nicosia. There, Glafkos joined the law firm of his father John Klerides, and the two settled down to make a life for themselves and to rear their daughter. Had it not been for the gradual, postwar collapse of the British empire, the younger Klerides might still be vying with Rauf Denктаş for the leadership of the Cypriot bar.

As it worked out, the two young lawyers and friendly rivals found themselves on opposite sides in the bloody conflict that broke out on the island in the mid-1950s: more often than not, Glafkos Klerides defended the Greek Cypriot terrorists whom Rauf Denктаş brought to trial; and, while the former was secretly cooperating with George Grivas' National Organization of (Greek) Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), the latter was secretly the leader of EOKA's Turkish Cypriot counterpart Volkan. After the settlement of 1959 and Britain's withdrawal, the defense attorney served alongside the former prosecutor in the Cypriot Parliament. Klerides became the chief adviser and heir apparent to Archbishop Makarios, the Cypriot President, while Denктаş remained the power behind the throne occupied by the newborn republic's Turkish Vice-President, Dr. Fazıl Küçük. When intercommunal strife broke out on the 21st of December, 1963 and the Republic of Cyprus collapsed, both men were deeply involved. It was about that event that Klerides and I most often spoke--and about the so-called Akritas Plan.

## I

Not much more than twenty years ago, on the 21st of April, 1966, the Greek Cypriot newspaper *Patrís* published a document that has been at the heart of the Cyprus dispute ever since. Though defunct and now virtually forgotten, *Patrís* was a journal of considerable importance at the time; for all practical purposes, it functioned as a mouthpiece for George Grivas, Archbishop Makarios' principal rival in the struggle for leadership then underway within the Greek Cypriot community. Like Makarios, Grivas was a Greek Cypriot by birth--but he had spent the better part of his career on the Greek mainland; and, in 1966, he was a Lieutenant General in the Royal Hellenic Army. Few Greeks of his generation achieved greater fame. In the 1940s, when he held the rank of Colonel, Grivas had gained notoriety on the mainland as the leader of *Chi*, an extreme rightwing, monarchist, guerrilla organization said to have employed torture and assassination against Hellas' communists and their leftist allies during the Greek Civil War. In the late 1950s, he became a hero in the eyes of many Greeks for the role that he then played in the Greek Cypriot struggle to persuade Cyprus' British rulers to cede the island to Greece. With the support of Makarios, Grivas organized the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) and launched a dramatic and highly successful campaign of terror against the British and their local supporters. In 1959, when Britain committed herself to granting the island independence, Makarios and the Greek administration lead by Constantine Karamanlis persuaded Grivas--much against the wiry soldier's better instincts--to end the struggle, retire from the fray, withdraw from the island, settle in Athens, and devote his waning years to collecting stamps. Not long thereafter, Grivas was to be found on the stump throughout Hellas, denouncing Makarios for signing the Zurich and London accords which had brought the island a modicum of independence at the price of explicitly prohibiting *enosis*--unification with Greece. In 1964, he returned to Cyprus to command and train the Greek Cypriot National Guard then established on the orders of Archbishop Makarios. There is reason to suspect that Grivas supplied *Patrís* with the document that it published late in April, 1966.

For Makarios and his closest supporters, Grivas' return to Cyprus was an admission of defeat, and the aging general was clearly intent on humiliating the Archbishop. The document published by *Patrís* bore the signature "The Chief AKRITAS" and purported to be a plan drawn up early in 1963 with the full knowledge of Makarios on the orders of his Minister of the Interior Polykarpos Georgadjis, a former lieutenant of Grivas. "Akritas" ('Frontiersman') was the epithet of Dighenis, the legendary hero said to have defended the marches of the Byzantine Empire in its years of decline. To link his cause with Greece's glorious Byzantine past, Grivas had adopted Dighenis as his *nom de guerre* when he launched the EOKA struggle, and the Akritas of the document (Georgadjis himself) did not hesitate to follow his example. The program outlined therein aimed at liberating the Greek Cypriots from the limitations imposed on them in the Zurich and London Accords so that they could achieve *enosis*. Those responsible for it hoped to complete the task that Grivas had been persuaded under duress to leave half-finished. By publishing what came to be known as "The Akritas Plan," Grivas and his supporters could demonstrate just how far Makarios and his associates had fallen short of accomplishing their ends. In the process, the editors of *Patrís* unwittingly handed the Turkish Cypriot leadership a propaganda tool that Rauf Denktaş and his minions have not to this day ceased to employ.

If you travel to southern Cyprus, as I did in early December, and query the Greek Cypriots concerning the history of the Republic of Cyprus, you will rarely, if ever hear anything of the Akritas Plan. But if you cross the Green Line at the Ledra Palace in Nicosia and pay a visit to the Turkish Cypriot Press Information Office or drop in on the current Foreign Minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to make inquiries on the same line, you will hear of little else. By the same token, if you read the literature produced by the Greek Cypriots or by those outsiders most sympathetic to their cause, you will find that the Akritas Plan is never mentioned--not even to be denounced as a forgery.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, observers who take pains to be fair

to both parties of the Cyprus dispute also tend to remain silent on the question.<sup>2</sup> Apart from the Turkish Cypriots and the handful of commentators who accept their arguments uncritically,<sup>3</sup> I know of only one writer inclined to believe that the document is genuine.<sup>4</sup> As it happens, he is right. So, Glafkos Klerides told me one warm and sunny morning in early December.

## II

I wrote the bulk of this letter last January--shortly after I returned to Istanbul from Cyprus. I failed to finish it because, en route back from Cyprus, I had spent Christmas in Vienna, once again enjoying the hospitality of former Institute Fellow Denny Rusinow and his wife Mary. Denny has covered the island for many years for the Universities Field Staff International;<sup>5</sup> he knows nearly all of the principal figures on the island; and he had been particularly helpful to me in securing an introduction to Klerides. As you would expect, we had much to talk about in late December. I told him what I had learned of the current state of affairs on the island, and we spoke as well of events in the not too far distant past. Needless to say, the Akritas Plan figured often in these discussions.

Denny was as surprised as I had been to learn that the document published by *Patrís* was genuine, and he was even more taken aback by the fact that a politician as canny as Klerides had acknowledged the fact. He wondered out loud whether the aging Greek Cypriot had meant our discussion to be off the record; and, when I responded that Klerides had given no indication that this was the case, he urged me, nonetheless, to think twice before including Klerides' revelation in an Institute letter.

I did think twice. I began a letter on the subject. Then, I thought a third time and set the matter aside. There was no need to be in a hurry--even though the early history of the Cypriot Republic could hardly be termed a matter of merely academic interest. I break silence now for two reasons: at some point, the genuineness of the document should become a matter of historical record; and, on Cyprus in recent months, Alekos Constantinides, editor of *Alētheía*, a journal closely associated with Klerides, has begun talking openly of the Akritas Plan. Klerides appears to believe that it now serves his purpose to make public the conspiratorial dimension of Greek Cypriot politics in the early 1960s, and I think that I can now see why he spoke so openly with me concerning so delicate a subject. After the Turkish intervention on the island in 1974, Klerides and Makarios quarreled; the Archbishop moved to exclude his former associate from the political arena; and Klerides has been publicly critical of Makarios' conduct of office ever since. Though some of the dirty linen being aired once belonged to Glafkos Klerides himself, the veteran politician has as powerful an interest in discrediting the late Archbishop today as George Grivas had when Makarios was still alive in 1966. Klerides seems also now to believe that it was, in truth, always in the interest of the Greek Cypriots to reach an accommodation with their Turkish neighbors and that no such reconciliation will ever be possible until and unless the

1. Consider the silence on this score of Charles Foley and W. I. Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus* (Stanford 1975); Michael Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (Edinburgh 1979); and Christopher Hitchens, *Cyprus* (London 1984).
2. See, for example, Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (London 1978), and Andrew Borowiec, *The Mediterranean Feud* (New York 1983).
3. See, for example, Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus* (New York 1982) 81-84, 97, 121.
4. See Stanley Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography* (London 1981) 160-162, 168.
5. This was formerly known as the American Universities Field Staff.

Greeks of the island come to admit to themselves and to the world the enormity of what they have done. So, at least, I thought in December; so, I think even now.

### III

The article published in *Patris* in April, 1966 included Glafkos Klerides among those responsible for the Akritas Plan. When I spoke with him, Klerides did not deny having been involved, but he took considerable care to leave me with the impression that his role was peripheral. As he told the story, Archbishop Makarios and Polykarpos Georgadjis were the central figures. To be precise: Klerides indicated that, on Makarios' instructions, the Interior Minister commissioned a number of Greek Cypriot officers serving in the Greek Army to draw up a detailed plan specifying the measures to be taken by the police and by the Greek army contingent stationed on Cyprus under the Treaty of Alliance should there be serious intercommunal violence. To clarify why this seemed necessary, I have appended to this letter a translation of the document published by *Patris*.<sup>6</sup>

As that document makes clear, in the early 1960s, the Greek Cypriot leadership was still intent on achieving *enosis* with Greece. Though Makarios and his supporters had been party to the Zurich-London accords, they had broken with Grivas over means and not over ends. They took seriously the British threat to divide the island between Greece and Turkey; and, to prevent that, they were willing to accept independence on terms that appeared to rule out *enosis* altogether but that could and would be revised as soon as circumstances permitted. In practice, the Greek ethnarch and his followers saw the Republic of Cyprus as an interim regime, as a stepping stone on the road to their achievement of "the national objective." Once the British were gone, Makarios and his associates believed, it would be relatively easy to remove the obstacles that stood in the way of the Cypriots' achieving full "self-determination." From the outset, "self-determination" was a codeword for *enosis*. "Self-determination" meant that the Turkish minority on Cyprus would have to put up with the island's absorption by Greece and with the discrimination that they would thereafter inevitably suffer as Muslim citizens and property-owners in a Greek Orthodox state.

Given their numerical preponderance, the Greeks could easily have imposed their will on their Turkish neighbors--were it not for Cyprus' close proximity to Asia Minor. Given the island's distance from mainland Greece and given its vulnerability to Turkish assault, Makarios thought it essential that Turkey be prevented from interfering with the steps that would be undertaken as he and his supporters moved towards a declaration of *enosis*. The Greek Cypriot ethnarch was persuaded that world public opinion, if properly manipulated, would serve to restrain the Turks. Consequently, the Akritas Plan presupposed a policy of gradualism. First, it would be necessary to persuade the nonaligned nations, the members of the United Nations, Britain, and the United States that the Cypriot Constitution with its system of ethnic checks and balances was unworkable. Then, it would be possible to eliminate the veto given the Turkish Cypriots in the 1959 Constitution. Thereafter, once the Greek majority was in full control of the government apparatus, it would be possible to repudiate the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee that gave Turkey the right to station troops on the island and to intervene--unilaterally, if necessary--in defense of the Republic of Cyprus as constituted in 1959. Finally, the Greek Cypriot leadership could stage a plebiscite, and the island's Greek majority could vote openly and publicly for union with Hellas.

As the document published by *Patris* makes evident, when the Akritas Plan was commissioned, Makarios and his associates were persuaded that they had pretty much achieved

6. For the translation, see Zaim M. Nejatigil, *Our Republic in Perspective* (Nicosia 1985) 187-193.



GLAFKOS KLERIDES

the first objective. In the Nonaligned Movement, at the United Nations, and in the councils of Europe, Makarios had emerged as a figure of consequence; Fazıl Küçük was virtually unknown; and the ethnic tensions on Cyprus had come to be seen as an annoyance. Those familiar with the embassy circuit in Nicosia encountered few diplomats who had any sympathy for the Turkish cause, and the "reactionaries" who supported George Grivas and threatened precipitant action could easily be contained.

Makarios and his minions had few illusions regarding the obstacles that stood in the way of their accomplishing the second of their goals. No one supposed that Fazıl Küçük, Rauf Denktaş, and their allies within the Turkish community would agree to accept a revision of the Constitution. That is why it was deemed essential that Georgadjis and the police force be prepared for intercommunal violence. If Makarios, Klerides, and their supporters could engineer the collapse of the republic, if they could demonstrate to the world that the Turks were obstructing the operations of the central administration and that the regime, as things stood, was completely unworkable, then, the Greeks could unilaterally impose a change of regime. The island's Turks would no doubt resist--but, if preparations were properly made, they would quickly be crushed. In effect, the Akritas Plan called for a Greek Cypriot coup d'etat.

When I spoke with Klerides, I asked whether Georgadjis' plan had been implemented in late December, 1963--shortly after Archbishop Makarios presented to Dr. Küçük his proposals for amending the Constitution; Küçük rejected the offer; and an incident involving Greek Cypriot policemen and a Turkish Cypriot prostitute touched off intercommunal violence in Nicosia.


Klerides answered in the affirmative: "Makarios had decided to change the unfair elements in the Constitution, and the Akritas Plan was prepared on the expectation that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots would react violently to any attempt on the Greek Cypriot side to bring about changes in the Zurich and London Accords; we even carried out exercises to test the plan and smooth out any difficulties that appeared. That was the plan we put into effect."

To this series of observations, Klerides added one proviso. The original scheme called for the Greek army contingent on the island to leave its base, surround the Turkish army contingent, and restrict it to quarters. In the crunch, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou was unwilling to take that risk: he had only recently been able to oust Constantine Karamanlis from power, and he was in the midst of an electoral campaign in Greece. In those circumstances, he could hardly afford to quarrel with Makarios, and that is what allowed Makarios a relatively free hand that fateful December. But, by the same token, Papandreou could hardly risk a confrontation with Turkey, and there was no telling whether a move by the Greek army against the Turkish army on Cyprus might not become a *casus belli*.

I cannot say whether direct intervention by the Greek army might have altered the results. It is simply not possible to know. As things worked out, the security forces under Georgadjis' control--supplemented as they were by the remnants of the various EOKA factions--were unable to overrun the Turkish quarter. Denktas' military underground was intact; and, though poorly armed, the Cypriot Turks had been preparing for an assault of the sort that came. The Turkish army contingent on the island left its quarters and threw its weight on the side of Cyprus' principal minority. The Turkish army on the mainland mobilized, but--as Makarios expected--the United States intervened to prevent an invasion of the island. And the final result was a stalemate that left most the island's Turks concentrated in enclaves and that resulted in George Papandreou authorizing George Grivas' return to the island.

In the end, Grivas proved no abler than Georgadjis in paving the way for *enosis*. The stalemate was broken only by the coup which the Greek Colonels mounted against Makarios in the summer of 1974, by the arrival of the Turkish army soon thereafter, and by the partition of the island that followed. The Akritas Plan can perhaps best be seen as a conspiracy that failed: for that failure, the Greeks of Cyprus have paid a very high price. I very much doubt that it will ever be possible to re-establish a modicum of trust between the island's two chief ethnic groups.

Sincerely,



Paul A. Rahe

# AKRITAS PLAN

**TOP SECRET**

**HEADQUARTERS**

Recent public statements by Archbishop Makarios have shown the course which our national problem will take in the near future. As we have stressed in the past, national struggles cannot be concluded overnight; nor is it possible to fix definite chronological limits for the conclusion of the various stages of development in national causes. Our national problem must be viewed in the light of developments which take place and conditions that arise from time to time, and the measures to be taken, as well as their implementation and timing, must be in keeping with the internal and external political conditions. The whole process is difficult and must go through various stages because factors which will affect the final conclusion are numerous and different. It is sufficient for everyone to know, however, that every step taken constitutes the result of a study and that at the same time it forms the basis of future measures. Also, it is sufficient to know that every measure now contemplated is a first step and only constitutes a stage towards the final and unalterable national objective which is the full and unconditional application of the right of self-determination.

As the final objective remains unchanged, what must be dwelt upon is the method to be employed towards attaining that objective. This must of necessity, be divided into internal and external (international) tactics because the methods of the presentation and the handling of our cause within and outside the country are different.

## **A. METHOD TO BE USED OUTSIDE**

In the closing stages of the (EOKA) struggle, the Cyprus problem had been presented to world public opinion and to diplomatic circles as a demand of the people of Cyprus to exercise the right of self-determination. But the question of the Turkish minority had been introduced in circumstances that are known, inter-communal clashes had taken place and it had been tried to make it accepted that it was impossible for the two communities to live together under a united administration. Finally the problem was solved, in the eyes of many international circles, by the London and Zurich Agreements, which were shown as solving the problem following negotiations and agreements between the contending parties.

1. Consequently our first aim has been to create the impression in the international field that the Cyprus problem has not been solved and that it has to be reviewed.
2. The creation of the following impressions has been accepted as the primary objective:
  - a. that the solution which has been found is not satisfactory and just;
  - b. that the agreement which has been reached is not the result of the free will of the contending parties;
  - c. that the demand for the revision of the agreements is not because of any desire on the part of the Greeks to dishonour their signature, but an imperative necessity of survival for them;
  - d. that the co-existence of the two communities is possible, and
  - e. that the Greek majority, and not the Turks, constitute the strong element on which foreigners must rely.

3. Although it was most difficult to attain the above objectives, satisfactory results have been achieved. Many diplomatic missions have already come to believe strongly that the Agreements are neither just nor satisfactory, that they were signed as a result of pressure and intimidations without real negotiations, and that they were imposed after many threats. It has been an important trump card in our hands that the solution brought by the Agreements was not submitted to the approval of the people; acting wisely in this respect our leadership avoided holding a referendum. Otherwise, the people would have definitely approved the Agreements in the atmosphere that prevailed in 1959. Generally speaking, it has been shown that so far the administration of Cyprus has been carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks played only a negative part acting as a brake.
4. Having completed the first stage of our activities and objectives we must materialise the second stage on an international level. Our objective in this second stage is to show:
  - a. that the aim of the Greeks is not to oppress the Turks but only to remove the unreasonable and unjust provisions of the administrative mechanism;
  - b. that it is necessary to remove these provisions right away because tomorrow may be too late;
  - c. (Omitted)
  - d. that this question of revision is a domestic issue for Cypriots and does not therefore give the right of intervention to anyone by force or otherwise, and
  - e. that the proposed amendments are reasonable and just and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.
5. Generally speaking, it is obvious that today the international opinion is against any form of oppression, and especially against oppression of minorities. The Turks have so far been able to convince world public opinion that the union of Cyprus with Greece will amount to their enslavement. Under these circumstances we stand a good chance of success in influencing world public opinion if we base our struggle not on ENOSIS but on self-determination. But in order to be able to exercise the right of self-determination fully and without hindrance we must first get rid of the Agreements (e.g. The Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance etc.) and of those provisions of the Constitution which inhibit the free and unbridled expression of the will of the people and which carry dangers of external intervention. For this reason our first target has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which is the first Agreement to be cited as not being recognised by the Greek Cypriots.

When the Treaty of Guarantee is removed no legal or moral force will remain to obstruct us in determining our future through a plebiscite.

It will be understood from the above explanations that it is necessary to follow a chain of efforts and developments in order to ensure the success of our Plan. If these efforts and developments failed to materialise, our future actions would be legally unjustified and politically unattainable and we would be exposing Cyprus and its people to grave consequences. Actions to be taken are as follows:

1. The amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements and the consequent *de facto* nullification of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is essential because the necessity of amending the negative aspects of any Agreement is generally acceptable internationally and is considered reasonable (*passage omitted*) whereas an external intervention to prevent the amendment of such negative provisions is held unjustified and inapplicable.
2. Once this is achieved the Treaty of Guarantee (the right of intervention) will become legally and substantially inapplicable.
3. Once those provisions of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance which restrict the exercise of the right of self-determination are removed, the people of Cyprus will be able, freely, to express and apply its will.

4. It will be possible for the Force of the State (the Police Force) and in addition, friendly military Forces, to resist legitimately any intervention internally or from outside, because we will then be completely independent.

It will be seen that it is necessary for actions from (1) to (4) to be carried out in the order indicated.

It is consequently evident that if we ever hope to have any chance of success in the international field, we cannot and should not reveal or proclaim any stage of the struggle before the previous stage is completed. For instance, [if] it is accepted that the above four stages constitute the necessary course to be taken, then it is obvious that it would be senseless for us to speak of amendment (1) if stage (4) is revealed, because it would then be ridiculous for us to seek the amendment of the negative points with the excuse that these amendments are necessary for the functioning of the State and of the Agreements.

The above are the points regarding our targets and aims, and the procedure to be followed in the international field.

### **B. THE INTERNAL ASPECT**

Our activities in the internal field will be regulated according to their repercussions and to interpretations to be given to them in the world and according to the effect of our actions on our national cause.

1. The only danger that can be described as insurmountable is the possibility of a forceful external intervention. This danger, which could be met partly or wholly by our forces is important because of the political damage that it could do rather than the material losses that it could entail. If intervention took place before stage (3), then such intervention would be legally tenable at least, if not entirely justifiable. This would be very much against us both internationally and at the United Nations. The history of many similar incidents in recent times shows us that in no case of intervention, even if legally inexcusable, has the attacker been removed by either the United Nations or the other powers without significant concessions to the detriment of the attacked party. Even in the case of the attack on Suez by Israel, which was condemned by almost all members of the United Nations and for which Russia threatened intervention, the Israelis were removed but, as a concession, they continued to keep the port of Eilat in the Red Sea. There are however more serious dangers in the case of Cyprus.

If we do our work well and justify the attempt we shall make under stage (1) above, we will see, on the one hand, that intervention will not be justified and, on the other hand, we will have every support since, by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot take place before negotiations take place between the Guarantor Powers, that is Britain, Greece and Turkey. It is at this stage, i.e., at the stage of contacts (before intervention) that we shall need international support. We shall obtain this support if the amendments proposed by us seem reasonable and justified. Therefore, we have to be extremely careful in selecting the amendments that we shall propose.

The first step, therefore, would be to get rid of intervention by proposing amendments in the first stage. Tactic to be followed: (Omitted)

2. It is evident that for intervention to be justified there must be a more serious reason and a more immediate danger than simple Constitutional amendments. Such reasons can be:
  - a. The declaration of ENOSIS before actions (1) to (3).
  - b. Serious intercommunal unrest which may be shown as a massacre of Turks. The first reason is removed as a result of the Plan drawn up for the first stage and consequently what remains, is the danger of intercommunal strife. We do not intend to engage without provocation, in massacre or attack against the Turks. Therefore, (*section omitted*) the Turks can react strongly and incite incidents and strife, or falsely stage massacres, clashes, or bomb explosions in order to create the impression that the Greeks attacked the Turks and that intervention is

imperative for their protection. Tactic to be employed: Our actions for amending the Constitution will not be secret; we would always appear to be ready for peaceful talks and our actions would not take any provocative and violent form. Any incidents that may take place will be met at the beginning, in a legal fashion by the legal Security Forces, according to a plan. Our actions will have a legal form.

3. (Omitted)
4. It is, however, naive to believe that it is possible for us to proceed to substantial actions for amending the Constitution, as a first step towards our more general Plan as described above, without expecting the Turks to create or stage incidents and clashes. For this reason the existence and the strengthening of our Organisation is imperative because:
  - a. if, in case of spontaneous resistance by the Turks, our counter attack is not immediate, we run the risk of having a panic created among Greeks, in towns in particular. We will then be in danger of losing vast areas of vital importance to the Turks, while if we show our strength to the Turks immediately and forcefully, then they will probably be brought to their sense and restrict their activities to insignificant, isolated incidents.
  - b. In case of a planned or unplanned attack by the Turks, whether this be staged or not, it is necessary to suppress this forcefully in the shortest possible time, since, if we manage to become the masters of the situation within a day or two, outside intervention would not be possible, probable or justifiable.
  - c. The forceful and decisive suppressing of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further Constitutional amendments, and it should then be possible to apply these without the Turks being able to show any reaction. Because they will learn that it is impossible for them to show any reaction without serious consequences for their Community.
  - d. In case of the clashes becoming widespread, we must be ready to proceed immediately through actions (1) to (4), including the immediate declaration of ENOSIS, because, then, there will be no need to wait or to engage in diplomatic activity.
5. In all these stages we must not overlook the factor of enlightening, and of facing the propaganda of those who do not know or cannot be expected to know our plans, as well as of the reactionary elements. It has been shown that our struggle must go through at least four stages and that we are obliged not to reveal our plans and intentions prematurely. It is therefore more than a national duty for everyone to observe full secrecy in the matter. Secrecy is vitally essential for our success and survival.

This, however, does not prevent the reactionaries and irresponsible demagogues from indulging in false patriotic manifestations and provocations. Our Plan would provide them with the possibility of putting forward accusations to the effect that the aims of our leadership are not national and that only the amendment of the Constitution is envisaged. The need for carrying out Constitutional amendments in stages and in accordance with the prevailing conditions, makes our job even more difficult. All this must not, however, be allowed to drag us to irresponsible demagoguery, street politics and a race of nationalism. Our deeds will be our undeniable justification. In any case owing to the fact that, for well-known reasons, the above Plan must have been carried out and borne fruit long before the next elections, we must distinguish ourselves with self-restraint and moderation in the short time that we have. Parallel with this, we should not only maintain but reinforce the present unity and discipline of our patriotic forces. We can succeed in this only by properly enlightening our members so that they in turn enlighten the public.

Before anything else we must expose the true identity of the reactionaries. These are petty and irresponsible demagogues and opportunists. Their recent history shows this. They are unsuccessful, negative and anti-progressive elements who attack our leadership like mad dogs but who are unable to put forward any substantive and practical solution of their own. In order to succeed in all our activities we need a strong and stable government, up to the last minute. They are known as clamorous slogan-creators who are good for nothing but speech-making. When it comes to taking definite actions or making sacrifices they are soon shown to be unwilling weaklings. A typical example of this is that even at the present stage they have no better proposal to make than to suggest that we should have recourse to the United Nations. It is therefore necessary that they should be isolated and kept at a distance.

We must enlighten our members about our plans and objectives **ONLY VERBALLY**. Meetings must be held at the subheadquarters of the Organisation to enlighten leaders and members so that they are properly equipped to enlighten others. **NO WRITTEN EXPLANATION OF ANY SORT IS ALLOWED. LOSS OR LEAKAGE OF ANY DOCUMENT PERTAINING TO THE ABOVE IS EQUIVALENT TO HIGH TREASON.** There can be no action that would inflict a heavier blow to our struggle than any revealing of the contents of the present document or the publication of this by the opposition.

Outside the verbal enlightenment of our members, all our activities, and our publications in the press in particular, must be most restrained and must not divulge any of the above. Only responsible persons will be allowed to make public speeches and statements and will refer to this Plan only generally under their personal responsibility and under the personal responsibility of the Chief of [the] sub-headquarters concerned. Also, any reference to the written Plan should be done only after the formal approval of the Chief of the sub-headquarters who will control the speech or statement. But in any case such speech or statement **MUST NEVER BE ALLOWED TO APPEAR IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER PUBLICATION.**

The tactic to be followed: Great effort must be made to enlighten our members and the public **VERBALLY**. Every effort must be made to show ourselves as moderates. Any reference to our plans in writing, or any reference in the press or in any document is strictly prohibited. Responsible officials and other responsible persons will continue to enlighten the public and to increase its morale and fighting spirit without ever divulging any of our plans through the press or otherwise.

**NOTE:** The present document should be destroyed by burning under the personal responsibility of the Chief of the sub-headquarters and in the presence of all members of the staff within 10 days of its being received. It is strictly prohibited to make copies of the whole or any part of this document. Staff members of sub-headquarters may have it in their possession only under the personal responsibility of the Chief of sub-headquarters, but in no case is anyone allowed to take it out of the office of sub-headquarters.

The Chief  
AKRITAS